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Rational expectations models make stringent assumptions on the agent’s
knowledge about the true model. This paper introduces a model in which the
rational agent realizes that using a given model involves approximation errors,
and adjusts behavior accordingly. If the researcher accounts for this empir-
ical rationality on part of the agent, the resulting empirical model assigns
likelihood to the data actually observed, unlike in the unmodified rational ex-
pectations case. A Lucas (1978)-type asset pricing model which incorporates
empirical rationality is constructed and estimated using U.S. stock data. The
equilibrium asset pricing function is seriously affected by the existence of ap-
proximation errors and the descriptive properties and normative implications
of the model are significantly improved. This suggests that investors do not
— and should not — ignore approximation errors.
Keywords: Approximation errors, model uncertainty, estimation of struc-
tural models, rational expectations, asset pricing.
1. Introduction
Structural economic models1 usually provide unique values of the variables rep-
resenting equilibrium behavior, b(xt), once the values of the state variables, xt,
are given. This property is troubling in an empirical setting. Since all structural
models are simplifications, their implications will be violated by empirical data,
bt 6= b(xt), and two related problems arise. First, there is a strong tradition of
modeling rational agents as if they believe the structural model to be an exact
description of the economic reality. Rational agents are assumed to ignore the
difference between their empirical environment and the theory. Second, since the
structural model does not assign likelihood to the empirical data, the researcher
∗I thank Bent Jesper Christensen, Allan Wurtz, and seminar participants at Copenhagen
Business School and Lund University for suggestions and comments. Financial support from
Centre for Analytical Finance (CAF) is gratefully acknowledged.
1In this paper, a \structural economic model" is an explicit description of how rational utility
maximizing agents determine expectations, decisions, and equilibrium prices from their informa-
tion about the state of the economy.
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is left with a statistically degenerate model where standard maximum likelihood
inference is not possible, see Rust (1994). The two problems are obviously related,
but have been addressed separately by the literature as model uncertainty and the
breaking of statistical degeneracy. The rest of Section 1 briefly reviews these two
strains of the literature, then suggests an approximation error approach, providing
a unified solution to the two problems.
1.1. Model Uncertainty
Knight (1921) is the first to address the question of how economic agents re-
act upon uncertainty about the appropriate theoretical model. Variations in the
empirical environment are separated into risk and Knightian uncertainty/model
uncertainty2. Risk refers to events to which the theoretical model assigns well-
defined probabilities, whereas uncertainty refers to events to which no objective
probabilities can be assigned. The question of whether or not this distinction
should have methodological implications divides the literature in two.
One approach to model uncertainty builds on Ellsberg (1961), who suggests a
methodological treatment of model uncertainty outside the traditional paradigm of
Savage (1954). Along these lines, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) suggest that agents
consider a set of possible models and expect the worst model to apply. This least
favorable prior approach to model uncertainty has been applied by, for instance,
Epstein and Wang (1994), Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), and Hansen
and Sargent (2000). Although this research outside the traditional paradigm of
Savage (1954) might have significant descriptive value, Sims (2001) has questioned
the normative value of the approach.
Another interpretation of Knight (1921) is found in LeRoy and Singell (1987) and
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p. 9), see also Arrow (1951), who claim that when no
objective probabilities can be assigned to Knightian uncertainty, subjective proba-
bilities are formed and treated as objective probabilities. This interpretation natu-
rally leads to the Bayesian approach to model uncertainty, see, e.g., Draper (1995)
and Hansen and Sargent (2000).
Both approaches provide a new optimal behavior, b˜(xt), and although model
uncertainty is admitted for some parts of the model, the maintained hypothesis is
that the policy implication is true:
bt = b˜(xt).(1)
But b˜(xt) is singlevalued for both approaches and (1) is not more likely to apply to
empirical data than with b(xt) on the right hand side. The statistical degeneracy
of the equilibrium implications is not dealt with, and an empirical confrontation
must rely on other methods to break the degeneracy.
2The terms model uncertainty and Knightian uncertainty will be used interchangeably.
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1.2. Breaking Statistical Degeneracy
Following a pragmatic statistical approach, an approximation error term, zt,
could be added to reflect the shortcomings of the theory:
bt = b(xt) + zt.(2)
If an appropriate distribution is assumed for zt, (2) breaks the statistical degener-
acy. However, the approach in (2) is inconsistent from a symmetry point of view.
The optimal policy is based on the fact that agents believe bt = b(xt) to be true,
which is clearly in conflict with the researcher believing (2).3 Aware of this prob-
lem, the existing literature on maximum likelihood estimation of structural models
has insisted that the model is true and used other approaches to circumvent the
problem of statistical degeneracy. Mainly, two approaches have been used: The
measurement error approach and the unobserved state variable approach.4
The measurement error approach is more confident about the model than the
data and assumes that the observed data differ from the true empirical values, b∗t ,
by a measurement error term: bt = b
∗
t + et. Since the model is assumed true b
∗
t =
b(xt), the error term equals the difference between the implications of the theory
and the observed data, bt = b(xt)+et. If distributional assumptions are made with
respect to et, maximum likelihood inference is possible.
5 This approach has mainly
been used to estimate macroeconomic models, see Altugˇ (1989), Watson (1993),
McGrattan (1994), and others.
The unobserved state variable approach recognizes that the singlevalued rela-
tionship from state variables to decision and price variables are violated by data.
To avoid this direct confrontation, the model is only taken to the data if the state
variables, or a subset of these, are unobserved by the researcher. Contrary to the
researcher, the agents are assumed to observe the state variables, and their deci-
sions will reflect this knowledge. Using the observed behavior, the state variables
are then identified by the researcher, xt = b
−1(bt), and if assumptions are made
with respect to the distribution of xt, maximum likelihood inference is possible.
The approach has been widely used in estimation of structural microeconometric
models, see Wolpin (1984), Miller (1984), Pakes (1986), Rust (1987), and others.
Both the measurement error approach and the unobserved state variable ap-
proach succeed in breaking the statistical degeneracy while maintaining the hy-
pothesis that the theoretical model is true. The underlying assumptions do not
seem valid in general, however. Although the unobserved state variable approach
maintains the symmetry assumption with respect to the functional forms of the
model, the approach breaks the symmetry with respect to information: The agents
3The discussion here also applies when the behavior is based on the least favorable prior
approach or the Bayesian approach to model uncertainty, b˜(xt). This is not obvious. To see the
point, note that although the agent recognizes some kind of model uncertainty while deriving
b˜(xt), this is usually done with the assumption that (1) applies without errors.
4Of interest is also the widely used GMM-approach to estimation of Euler equations, see Hansen
and Singleton (1982), but this approach is applied to models without an explicit description of how
expectations are formed, not to structural models as dened above, unless parts of the structure
are ignored.
5A full measurement error analysis includes measurement errors on the state variables also.
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observe more than the researcher. While this asymmetry might be reasonable in
a microeconomic setting,6 it is problematic in a macroeconomic setting. Similarly,
measurement errors are not a reasonable explanation in situations where the data
quality is high and the empirical fit is poor, as, for instance, in some financial
models.
1.3. The Approximation Error Approach
By allowing approximation errors, this paper treats model uncertainty and sta-
tistical degeneracy in a unified setting. The hope of finding the true structural
model is abandoned. Instead, a useful structural model is considered. Neither the
agent nor the researcher believes that the useful structural model is exactly true,
but recognize approximation errors as the reason for the difference between theory
and data. The result is an integration of (1) and (2).
The approximation error approach differs from the traditional approaches to
breaking the statistical degeneracy since the decisions of the agents are affected
by model uncertainty, b˜(xt) 6= b(xt). The approach also differs from traditional
approaches to model uncertainty, since the implications of the theory, even when
approximation errors are taken into account by the agents, can differ from the
empirical data:
bt = b˜(xt) + zt.(3)
Following Knight (1921), the b˜(xt)-term should be interpreted as the risk-part
of the empirical variation in bt, that is, the part to which well-defined objective
probabilities are assigned. The approximation error term, zt, represents Knightian
uncertainty/model uncertainty, since this part of the variation is not accounted for
by the structural theoretical model.
This paper is kept in the traditional normative framework of Savage (1954) by
following LeRoy and Singell (1987): Subjective beliefs with respect to the distri-
bution of zt are formed and treated as objective probabilities. To close the model
with respect to expectations, the standard symmetry assumption of the rational
expectation tradition is imposed: If the researcher believes (3), given a stochastic
distribution of zt, the agents should determine b˜(xt) believing (3) and the same
distributional assumptions as the researcher. If the beliefs are empirically rele-
vant, this approach will break the statistical degeneracy and allow for standard
maximum likelihood inference.
It might not be obvious why bt is chosen by agents when b˜(xt) is recommended
by the structural model. The problem is especially troubling for micro models. The
argument is that agents consider the structural model only as a useful tool, not
the true description of the economic environment. The individual agent recognizes
that events not described by the structural model do take place and make the agent
deliberately decide differently from what is implied by the model.7
6An obvious exception is when the researcher and the agent happen to be the same person.
7The optimization error approach to statistical degeneracy assumes that the dierence between
the optimal and the actual decisions are unintended by the agents, see Rust (1994). The approach,
which has received little attention in the literature, can be seen as a special case of the approxi-
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The approximation error approach has several advantages. First, the approach
succeeds in introducing model uncertainty without giving up the rationality of
Savage’s normative framework, thereby avoiding the criticism of Sims (2001). Of
course, from a descriptive point of view, this might be less of an advantage.
The approach is not capable of addressing observations like the Paradox of Ells-
berg (1961). Still, the approximation error approach does not exclude the intro-
duction of Bayesian learning with respect to the most useful model, or that the
agents form expectations according to the least favorable prior approach.
Second, unlike both measurement errors and unobserved state variables, it is
hard to imagine situations where approximation errors are not a reasonable expla-
nation of a deviation between theory and data, and the approach may, of course,
be combined with measurement errors or unobserved state variables when this is
appropriate.
Finally, the approximation error approach offers technical advantages. The mea-
surement error approach cannot be applied to nonlinear specifications, except in
special cases, see Rust (1994). Moreover, to apply the unobserved state variable
approach, an invertibility condition must be satisfied, see Pakes (1994). As shown
below, such restrictions are not imposed by the approximation error approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple version
of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model and shows that the model is statistically
degenerate and subject to approximation errors. Section 3 adds approximation
errors to the model and re-optimizes with respect to the rational investor’s invest-
ment problem. Section 4 estimates the model using U.S. stock data and shows how
both the descriptive and the normative properties of the model are significantly im-
proved, once approximation errors are taken into account. From a descriptive point
of view, the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985), as well as the
stock market volatility puzzle, see Shiller (1981) and Grossman and Shiller (1981),
are addressed. From a normative point of view, the model predicts expected excess
returns and the risk involved in exploiting these much more accurately than the
traditional model without approximation errors.
2. A Theoretical Asset Pricing Model
Assume that a Lucas (1978)-type asset pricing model is a useful theoretical model
for the situation at hand. At time t a representative investor, or equivalently a
number of identical investors, receives an endowment, et, which can be used for
consumption, ct, to gain utility, u(ct), or it can be used for investments in a financial
asset which pays stochastic dividends d in the future. To maximize the expected
infinite horizon utility at an arbitrary point in time, say t = 0, the investor solves
the following problem:
mation error approach except that zt is given a specic interpretation. Hence, the optimization
error approach should be implemented similar to the approximation error approach.
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max
w
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct),
s.t.
ct = et + dtwt + pt(wt − wt+1),
(4)
where d0 and c0 are given, wt is the investor’s holding of the financial asset, pt is
the price of the asset, and 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor. E0 denotes
expectations conditioned at information available at t = 0. The utility function is
assumed to be a standard constant relative risk aversion-type:
u(ct) =
c1−γt − 1
1− γ
,
where γ > 0. To simplify, w is assumed to represent excess demand relative to a
fixed supply. Therefore, wt = 0 and ct = et in equilibrium. In this model, et (and
hence ct) and dt represent payoffs to equilibrium asset holdings and excess hold-
ings, respectively. Consumption (or, equivalently, endowments) and dividends are
assumed to follow stationary exogenous Markov processes. In the sequel, both will
affect the equilibrium price: Consumption by determining marginal utility, and div-
idends by determining asset payoffs. Two alternative autoregressive specifications
are considered in this paper: One specification with additive shocks,
dt = (1− δ) + δdt−1 + 
d
t ,
ct = (1− θ) + θct−1 + 
c
t ,
(5.A)
and one with multiplicative shocks,
dt = d
δ
t−1 exp(
d
t ),
ct = c
θ
t−1 exp(
c
t),
(5.M)
where |δ| < 1, |θ| < 1, and t = [
d
t , 
c
t ] are independent normally distributed
shocks with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Ω. Although not indicated by
the notation, µ and Ω differ between (5.A) and (5.M). For instance, µ is set to
zero in the additive case, but slightly lower in the multiplicative case, to insure that
the unconditional expected values of dt and ct equal one, see Appendix A.
8 Each
of the two specifications above has advantages over the other. The multiplicative
specification in (5.M) offers closed form solutions for the equilibrium price, which
the additive specification in (5.A) does not. However, Section 3 shows that the
additive specification provides the most intuitive interpretation of the effects of
approximation errors.
To solve for the equilibrium price at time 0, consider the Euler equation obtained
from using the first order condition with respect to w1 and the equilibrium condition
8The additive specication assigns likelihood to negative values although negative consumption
is not allowed when γ ≥ 1. However, given realistic parameter values, the probability of negative
consumption is negligible. Moreover, the empirical analysis suggest that γ is not signicantly
greater than one.
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wt = 0,
9
p(d0, c0) = E0 β˜ (d1 + p1) , β˜ ≡ β
u′(c1)
u′(c0)
.(6)
Due to the Markov property, d0 and c0 summarize all available information about
the state of the economy at t = 0. To determine the equilibrium price, p(d0, c0),
only the investor’s expectations with respect to p1 are left to be specified. The
usual way to proceed is to follow the rational expectation paradigm initiated by
Muth (1961) and substitute p1 with p(d1, c1) to get a functional equation for the
price function:
pT (d0, c0) = E0 β˜
(
d1 + p
T (d1, c1)
)
.(7)
Here, pT denotes the price function derived based on the assumption that ratio-
nal agents expect future prices to be perfectly accounted for by the theoretical
model. This is the key assumption which is modified under the approximation
error approach in Section 3.
Following the conventional procedure, pT (d1, c1) in (7) might be replaced by
the right-hand side of the Euler equation derived from the first order condition
with respect to w2, i.e., (7) leaded once. This leaves p
T (d0, c0) as a function of
p2 or, when expectations are formed using the theoretical model, as a function
of pT (d2, c2). Applying this substitution repeatedly (and ruling out bobbles etc.)
gives
pT (d0, c0) = E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜tdt, β˜
t ≡ βt
u′(ct)
u′(c0)
.(8)
The price equals the expected sum of dividends discounted by a stochastic discount
factor β˜t depending on the marginal utility of consumption. If the multiplicative
specification in (5.M) is assumed, the expected value in (8) has a closed form
solution:
pT (d0, c0) =
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(αt−1)
0 d
δt
0 Λt,(9)
where Λt depend only on parameters and t, see Appendix A. Closed form solutions
are not available when the additive specification in (5.A) is assumed, and numerical
procedures are used below to determine the equilibrium price in this case, see
Appendix B.
The equilibrium price expression in (9) clearly illustrates the statistical degen-
eracy common to most structural models. If empirical values for d0 and c0 are
observed, pT (d0, c0) can easily be calculated for fixed parameters. Since the result
9In order to simplify the exposition, the agents are assumed to know the true parameter values
of the model, whereas the researcher must estimate them, see Section 4. To reestablish the
symmetry, a Bayesian approach could be adopted with respect to both the researcher's and the
agents' beliefs about the parameter values.
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is a single real number, it is very unlikely that this equilibrium price will ever
match the empirical counterpart, p0. Varying the parameters or choosing other
functional forms might bring the model to match the data for some observations,
but in general
pt 6= p
T (dt, ct)(10)
for (almost) all observations.10 Since the model does not assign likelihood to sit-
uations like (10), the model is statistically degenerated and maximum likelihood
inference not possible.
Measurement errors can hardly explain the empirical deviation. As shown em-
pirically in Section 4, the gab is simply too big. Regarding the unobserved state
variable approach, it is hard to deny that more state variables could improve the
model, but it is equally hard to believe that these should be known to the repre-
sentative agent and not to a single researcher in the academic community, cf. the
stock market volatility puzzle. In this case, approximation errors seem like a more
promising approach to break the statistical degeneracy.
3. An Empirical Asset Pricing Model
This section introduces an empirical model that is based on the idea of empirical
rationality. Before proceeding, some useful terminology is introduced. Let a con-
crete empirical data sample be given. First, a model that assigns no likelihood to
the empirical data is henceforth referred to as a theoretical model with respect to
the empirical data. Expectations formed using a theoretical model are theoretical
expectations. Behavior, which is optimal according to a theoretical model and the
corresponding theoretical expectations, reflects theoretical rationality.
Notice that the asset pricing model described in Section 2 is clearly theoretical
and since pt = p
T (dt, ct) is expected to apply for future prices, the expectations are
theoretical too. The equilibrium price in (8) therefore reflects theoretical rational-
ity.
Secondly, a model that does assign likelihood to the empirical data is an empirical
model. Expectations formed using an empirical model are empirical expectations.
Behavior, which is optimal according to an empirical model and the corresponding
empirical expectations, reflects empirical rationality.
3.1. Empirical Rationality: Additive Specification
Assume, as the researcher, that the model in (4) with the additive specifications
in (5.A) is a useful theoretical model. Yet, the implication of the model (here the
equilibrium price pE), is assumed to differ from the empirical asset price pt by an
approximation error term z,
pt = p
E + zt,(11)
10The trivial exception is the case where the number of free parameters equals or exceeds the
number of observations multiplied with the number of equilibrium implications of the model.
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where pE is the equilibrium price of the empirical model which is to be determined
below. Parallel to the interpretation of (3), pE is the implication of the struc-
tural model whereas zt reflects Knightian uncertainty/model uncertainty. Let the
subjective beliefs of both the researcher and the investor be described by
zt = ζzt−1 + 
z
t ,(12)
where |ζ| < 1 and t = [
d
t 
c
t 
z
t ]
> is independent across time and jointly normally
distributed with mean vector µ = 0 and covariance matrix Ω. Since likelihood
is assigned to all real values of zt, the model is empirical as long as pt and p
E
are finite. Finally, assume that also the representative investor is aware of the
approximation errors and use (11) and (12) to form expectations about future
prices. Thus, empirical expectations are formed.
In order to determine the equilibrium price based on empirical rationality, notice
that the Euler equation in (6) is still valid. However, when expectations with
respect to next period’s price are formed, p1 should be replaced by p
E + zt instead
of by the theoretical price pT . Therefore, (7) is replaced by
pE(d0, c0, z0) = E0β˜
(
d1 + p
E(d1, c1, z1) + z1
)
.(13)
Applying the usual repeated substitution procedure, but now using (11), gives
pE(d0, c0, z0) = E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜t(dt + zt)
= pT (d0, c0) + E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜tzt.
(14)
Notice that pE coincides with pT if approximation errors are absent. The effect of
the approximation errors under empirical rationality is naturally decomposed into
a predictability effect, ∆t, and an uncertainty premium, pi
z
t :
pE(d0, c0, z0)− p
T (d0, c0) = E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜tE0(zt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆0
+ E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜t (zt − E0(zt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
piz
0
.
(15)
The predictability effect arises when ζ 6= 0. Assume, for instance, that the ap-
proximation errors are positively autocorrelated, ζ > 0, and assume that the in-
vestor observes a higher price than predicted by the equilibrium price, z0 > 0.
Then, positive approximation errors should also be expected in the next period,
E0z1 = ζz0 > 0. The effect on the current equilibrium price is then illustrated
by the Euler equation in (13) with z1 replaced with E0z1 = ζz0. Since the in-
vestor predicts empirical prices above next period’s equilibrium price, the current
equilibrium price is increased by E0β˜ζz0. However, next periods equilibrium price,
pE(d1, c1, z1), and all other future prices are also affected by the fact that all future
approximation errors are expected to be positive. The empirically rational investor
foresees the increase in future equilibrium prices, and hence the current equilibrium
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price is increased even further by E0
∑
∞
t=2 β˜
tζtz0. The sum of this derived effect
and the direct effect equals ∆0 in (15).
Notice that in the case of constant consumption (ct = 1) the predictability
simplifies to
∆0 =
βζ
1− βζ
z0.(16)
Thus for ζ- and β-values close to one, the predictability effect may be considerably
larger than the approximation error itself.
The uncertainty premium, pizt , arises when the unexpected variation in the ap-
proximation errors is correlated with the consumption variation in the stochastic
discount factor β˜t. This happens when cov(zt , 
c
t) is nonzero. This definition of pi
z
t
is similar to the definition of the traditional risk premium, pidt , which captures the
uncertainty of payoff in the theoretical model:11
pid0 = E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜t (dt − E0(dt)) .
Besides premiums generated by variation in dt and zt, the wish to smooth con-
sumption, even when dt and zt are deterministic, generates a consumption risk
premium:
pic0 = E0
∞∑
t=1
βt
u′(ct)− u
′ (E0(ct))
u′(c0)
(E0(dt) + E0(zt)) .
Notice that for the additive specification (5.A) and (11), pidt + pi
c
t + pi
z
t equals
the difference between the equilibrium price and the certainty equivalent coun-
terpart. To see this, note that the certainty equivalent equilibrium price is given
by
∑
∞
t=1 β
t u
′(E0(ct))
u′(c0)
(E0(dt) + E0(zt)). Section 4 estimates and compares the three
premiums in order to access the importance of pizt .
Notice also that if the approximation errors are white noise,12 the approximation
errors will not affect the equilibrium price. In this case, the simple empirical model
pt = p
T (d0, c0) + 
z
t would in fact be a consistent with empirical rationality.
3.2. Empirical Rationality: Multiplicative Specification
Again, let (4) be a relevant theoretical asset pricing model, but let d and c follow
the multiplicative processes defined in (5.M). Moreover, assume that the beliefs
with respect to approximation errors are described by
pt = p
E zt,(17)
11The distinction between uncertainty premiums and risk premiums might appear subtle in the
setting above. It is hard to argue that the probabilities assigned to the evolution of dt and ct by
(5.A) and (5.M) are more objective than those assigned to the evolution of zt. Nevertheless, the
usual term risk is maintained.
12In this setting, ζ = cov(zt , 
d
t ) = cov(
z
t , 
c
t) = 0.
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where the specification of the z-process corresponds to the d and c processes:
zt = z
ζ
t−1 exp 
z
t .(18)
As before, |ζ| < 1 and t = [
d
t 
c
t 
z
t ]
> is time-independent jointly normally dis-
tributed. Finally, assume that the representative investor forms empirical expec-
tations according to (17) and (18). Contrary to the additive model, the model
described by (4), (5.M), (17), and (18) does not assign likelihood to negative val-
ues of d, c, and z. However, the model is still empirical if pt and p
E take finite
positive values.
The Euler equation in (6) is still valid. However, once the uncertainty augmented
expectation equation in (17) is used to substitute for p1, the relevant Euler equation
becomes
pE(d0, c0, z0) = E0
[
β˜
(
d1 + p
E(d1, c1, z1)z1
)]
.
Repeated substitution using (17) yields
pE(d0, c0, z0) = E0
∞∑
t=1
β˜tdtzt−1zt−2 · · · z1.
Notice that pE coincides with pT if the approximation error shocks z vanish. Even
with approximation errors, the multiplicative empirical rationality model offers a
closed form solution for the equilibrium asset pricing function,
pE(d0, c0, z0) =
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 Ψt,(19)
where Ψt depends on parameters and t, only, see Appendix A. The z0-term in
(19) clearly indicates a predictability effect when ζ 6= 0. Nevertheless, the effect of
the approximation errors under empirical rationality is not decomposed as easily
as with additive specification. The definitions of the different kinds of risk and
uncertainty premiums may be found in Appendix A, together with their closed
form expressions.
Although the approximation error specification in (17) and (18) is stationary,
the effect on the equilibrium price can be dramatic. Appendix A shows that pE is
infinite when
µz > −
σ2z
2(1−ζ) ≡ µ¯z,(20)
where µz and σ
2
z denote the mean and variance of 
z. Even µz = 0 results in an
infinite equilibrium price. For µz ≤ µ¯z, however, p
E is finite and well-behaved.
Thus, the equilibrium price displays a serious discontinuity in parameters. In the
empirical analysis, µz is determined by assuming (20) to apply with equality, this
being the closest possible value to that implied by the approach used for estimating
the ct and dt processes (see Appendix A) which still results in finite prices.
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Figure 1: The empirical series, real values
The dividends and the stock prices refer to the S&P Composite Stock Price Index provided by
Robert J. Shiller from his Yale-homepage. Consumption is real per capita consumption of non-
durables and services. Annual data, 1889{1997. (1889 = 100)
4. Estimation
4.1. Data
The data used for the empirical analysis are real annual dividends and stock
prices for the S&P Composite Stock Price Index and real per capita consumption
series used in Shiller (1989). The data have been updated (dividends and prices)
and made publicly available by Robert Shiller via his homepage. The consumption
series have been updated with data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
sample period is 1889–1997. Figure 1 shows real value indexes for all three variables
of the model. In order to work with a finite state space, the series are detrended
with a constant growth rate of 1.60% per year, which is the growth rate of per
capita consumption during the estimation period. The result is seen in Figure 2.
Finally, the mean of the detrended d and c series are normalized to one and the
price series is transformed accordingly to maintain the average price-dividend ratio
of 22.8 from the raw data.
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Figure 2: Detrended series (% from mean)
4.2. Estimation of the Exogenous Processes d and c
Since the d and c processes are exogenous to the model, it is possible to estimate
their parameters (δ, γ, and the relevant elements of Ω) independent of the asset
pricing model in (4). Table 1 shows maximum likelihood estimates of the parame-
ters in (5.A) and (5.M). The choice of specification seems to play a minor role for
the estimates. Both dividends and consumption are significantly serially correlated
and nearly 75% of the total variation is explained by these simple specifications.
For both specifications, the residuals display significantly more kurtosis than the
normal distribution, whereas the skewness estimates are more consistent with the
normality assumption.
The estimates in Table 1 will be taken as given when solving for the pricing
function and estimating the other parameters of the model.
4.3. The Models
In order to assess the effect of empirical rationality, the asset pricing model
is estimated in a theoretical rationality version as well as an empirical rationality
version. Both versions are estimated with additive and multiplicative specifications.
Consider first the two models based on empirical rationality analyzed in details in
Section 3:
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Table 1
Estimates of d and c process parameters
Specification δ/θ σd/σc ρd,c R
2 Normality
P−value
DW
Additive
d 0.8740
(0.0485)
0.1145
(0.0078) 0.4063
(0.0816)
0.7087 38.5176
0.0000
1.7007
c 0.8341
(0.0455)
0.0317
(0.0022)
0.7444 8.7012
0.0129
2.0768
Multiplic.
d 0.8652
(0.0499)
0.1179
(0.0080) 0.3611
(0.0850)
0.7090 33.4978
0.0000
1.6897
c 0.8437
(0.0453)
0.0314
(0.0021)
0.7456 13.3207
0.0013
2.1021
Notes: σd and σc are standard deviations of 
d and c. ρd,c is the correlation. Figures in brackets
are standard deviations based on the hessian of the loglikelihood function. The normality test is
a χ(2)-distributed Jarque{Bera joint skewness and kurtosis test. DW is the Durbin{Watson test
statistic for autocorrelation.
pt = p
E(dt, ct, zt) + zt,M
E
A
pt = p
E(dt, ct, zt)zt,M
E
M
where the subscripts of MEA and M
E
M refer to additive and multiplicative spec-
ification, respectively, and the superscript refer to empirical rationality. Their
counterparts are
pt = p
T (dt, ct) + zt,M
T
A
pt = p
T (dt, ct)zt, ,M
T
M
where the superscript indicates that the equilibrium price is based on theoretical
rationality. Thus, even though the researcher believes MTA and M
T
M (which are in
fact empirical models, since the presence of zt breaks the statistical degeneracy and
allows assigning likelihood to data), the investor ignores zt when the equilibrium
price is determined.
4.4. The Likelihood Function
The likelihood of the price series pt, t = {2, . . . T}, is conditioned on the first
observation p1 and the free parameters ω = (γ, β, ζ, σz, ρd,z, ρc,z). As mentioned,
the observations of dt and ct, the parameters of Table 1 and the implied values of
d and c are exogenous by assumption. The loglikelihood of the price series is then
given by
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`(pT , pT−1, · · · , p2|p1, ω) =
T∑
t=2
`(pt|pt−1, ω)
=
T∑
t=2
(
∂M
∂zt
∂zt
∂zt
)−1
`(zt |ω),
where M ∈ {MTA , M
T
M , M
E
A , M
E
M} and the Jacobian
∂M
∂z
∂z
∂z
is used for change of
measure from z to p.
4.5. Parameter Estimates
Panel A of Table 2 shows the estimation results. Notice that γ is imprecisely
estimated, and, based on a 95% likelihood ratio test, log-utility (γ = 1) cannot be
rejected for any of the four models.
Panel B of Tabel 2 shows the estimation results with the log-utility condition
imposed. The normality of zt is now accepted only at a 1% significance level for the
multiplicative specification. In return, the precision of all estimates as well as the
R2-values are improved compared to Panel A. Since the restriction also facilitates a
more direct comparison of risk and uncertainty premiums across models, log-utility
is imposed in the analysis below.
Except for σz, the parameter estimates in Panel B are constant across models.
The approximation errors show high autocorrelation, with estimates of ζ around 0.9
and strong significance. Thus, the predictability effect, ∆, of approximation errors
is significant. The correlations between the shocks, ρd,z and ρc,z, are significantly
positive, at approximately 0.5 and 0.35, respectively. The uncertainty premium, piz,
is therefore significant. As the estimates in Panel A show, this conclusion depends
on the log-utility restriction, however. The discount factor estimates are between
0.96 and 0.96513. Keeping the rationality type (empirical or theoretical) fixed, the
ratio of the σz-estimates for the additive and the multiplicative specification is
approximately equal to the empirical price/dividend ratio of 22.8.
An important result in Table 2 is the dramatic decrease in the size of approxima-
tion errors when empirical rationality is introduced. As a result, the estimates of
σz are reduced by 85-90%. The reduction is accompanied by an equally dramatic
increase in the R2-values. Both changes are mainly due to a major predictability
effect.
4.6. The Predictability Effect
The reduction in approximation errors caused by empirical rationality is clearly
illustrated in Figure 3. The empirical prices are shown together with the equi-
librium prices for both the theoretical and the empirical rationality model with
additive shocks. Obviously, pT explains very little of the empirical price varia-
tion. This stock market excess volatility is well documented by Shiller (1981) and
Grossman and Shiller (1981).
13Notice that in order to relate to yearly returns the β-estimates should be corrected for the
growth rate of 1.6%.
15
Table 2
Estimation results
β γ ζ σz ρd,z ρc,z Normality
P−value
DW R2 `
Panel A: All parameters free
MTA 0.9637
(0.0077)
2.3458
(1.1668)
0.9417
(0.0430)
3.2620
(0.2206)
0.3392
(0.1229)
0.0255
(0.2742)
0.5857
0.7462
1.8964 0.0422 -273.41
MTM 0.9600
(0.0057)
4.3083
(4.0818)
0.9098
(0.0364)
0.1499
(0.0258)
0.3552
(0.3121)
-0.2234
(0.6669)
4.2563
0.1191
1.9832 0.0548 -262.76
MEA 0.9615
(0.0071)
3.4303
(1.5484)
0.9288
(0.0413)
0.3399
(0.1454)
0.3010
(0.1381)
-0.1052
(0.2938)
0.1486
0.9284
1.9771 0.9904 -270.95
MEM 0.9642
(0.0060)
5.7121
(6.9891)
0.8984
(0.0383)
0.0224
(0.0155)
0.2449
(0.5139)
-0.4293
(0.9053)
3.0585
0.2167
2.0246 0.9806 -262.83
Panel B: γ = 1 imposed
MTA 0.9639
(0.0074)
1 0.9358
(0.0465)
3.4270
(0.2383)
0.4254
(0.0777)
0.3120
(0.0928)
0.6341
0.7283
1.8346 0.0490 -273.94
MTM 0.9603
(0.0051)
1 0.9020
(0.0371)
0.1549
(0.0101)
0.5368
(0.0646)
0.3291
(0.0740)
7.8357
0.0199
1.8175 0.1998 -263.17
MEA 0.9642
(0.0072)
1 0.9360
(0.0444)
0.3236
(0.1632)
0.4366
(0.0740)
0.3340
(0.0798)
0.2912
0.8645
1.8577 0.9912 -272.74
MEM 0.9645
(0.0055)
1 0.8937
(0.0345)
0.0221
(0.0055)
0.5287
(0.0638)
0.3293
(0.0744)
8.7039
0.0129
1.7855 0.9860 -263.34
Notes: Figures in brackets are standard deviations based on the hessian of the loglikelihood function. The normality test is the χ(2)-
distributed Jarque{Bera joint skewness and kurtosis test. DW is the Durbin{Watson test statistic for autocorrelation. The R2{gures are
based on a simple additive specication: pt = p
E(dt, ct, zt) + et, where the only explanatory eect of z is through p
E . ` is the value of the
loglikelihood function.
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Figure 3: Empirical price and model prices.
The equilibrium prices are based at MTA and M
E
A and the relevant parameter values of Panel B
of Table 2.
The empirical fit of pE is obviously much better. The reason for this dramatic
change is explained by the high persistence of the approximation errors, combined
with the predictability effect. To simplify the analysis, ignore risk premiums for
the moment and assume that future values of z and c equal their expected val-
ues. Assuming additive specification and using (14) and (16), the model can be
decomposed as:
pt = p
E(dt, ct, zt) + zt
= pT (dt, ct) +
βζ
1− βζ
zt + zt
≈ pT (dt, ct) + 9zt + zt, when β ≈ 0.96 and ζ ≈ 0.94.
(21)
The last line of (21) shows that when the empirical price differs from the one pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, the equilibrium price of the empirical model reacts
very strongly. Thus, 10% of the approximation error for the theoretical model now
explains the empirical variation. The remaining 90% are accounted for by a change
in the equilibrium price, due to the predictability of future approximation errors.
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Table 3
Risk and Uncertainty Premiums: Equilibrium Price Changes in %
Risk Uncertainty
Model pic pid piz
Steady State 0.306 -0.500 -
MTA
Data 0.306
(0.006)
-0.502
(0.022)
-
Steady State 0.313 -0.448 -
MTM
Data 0.313
(0.003)
-0.448
(0.004)
-
Steady State 0.312 -0.508 -1.431
MEA
Data 0.323
(0.020)
-0.643
(0.225)
-1.811
(0.632)
Steady State 0.316 -0.440 -0.352
MEM
Data 0.312
(0.006)
-0.434
(0.008)
-0.341
(0.017)
Notes: \Steady state" is the \deterministic steady state": (d, c, z) = (0, 0, 0)/(1, 1, 1) for the
additive/multiplicative specication. \Data" is average eects implied by the models for the
empirical data-series, 1889-1997. Figures in brackets are standard deviations. All gures are
based on the estimates in Table 2, Panel B.
This explains the 90% drop in the estimated σz-values in Table 2. With a 85%
drop in the σz estimate, the results for the multiplicative specification are simular
to those of the additive specification.
Adding approximation errors does not explain why the empirical stock price
deviates from the theoretical one in the first place, but the model does show that a
significant part of the observed deviation might actually be a rational response to
a smaller unexplained part. In this light, the stock market excess volatility seems
quantitatively less at odds with rationality of the stock market.
4.7. Risk and Uncertainty Premiums
Empirically, the predictability effect far dominates the uncertainty premium
effect of approximation errors, but risk and uncertainty premiums in asset pricing
models are interesting in their own right. Mehra and Prescott (1985) and the
literature initiated by this study show that traditional rational expectation models
are unable to explain the high empirical premium on stocks. This equity premium
puzzle is particularly troubling for Lucas (1978)-type models with endogenous price
determination, since the price volatility and the resulting premium generated by
these models are very low, even compared to Mehra and Prescott (1985)-type
models. Empirical rationality and approximation errors are interesting in this
context, since a new type of uncertainty and premium are added to the model.
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Table 3 shows the risk and uncertainty premiums implied by the four models.
All numbers are calculated using the parameter estimates in Panel B of Table 2.
In particular, they all share the same relative risk aversion factor, γ = 1. All
figures have been calculated for the deterministic steady state values of c and d.
Moreover, the figures have been calculated as the average of the premiums implied
by the observed empirical series of p, d, and c. Since the effects are not constant
over the state space, the empirical premiums vary. The standard deviation is
calculated to illustrate the size of this variation.
Starting with the dividend risk, the risk premium lowers the equilibrium price.
The fall is approximately 0.5% for all models, but slightly higher for the additive
than the multiplicative specification. This difference should come as no surprise,
since the additive specification assigns higher probability to the worst case scenar-
ios. The sign of the price change is expected, too. Since the shocks to consumption
and dividends are positively correlated, dividends are a poor insurance against
future consumption uncertainty.
Turning to the premiums attributed to the existence of approximation errors,
these are obviously only available for empirical rationality models. Again, positive
correlation between the shocks to consumption and to approximation errors causes
the equilibrium price to fall. Although the size of the fall now differs more across
the specifications, the effect is roughly of the same magnitude as the traditional
risk premium for all specifications. This result is of interest for the equity premium
puzzle. Although the model is never close to explaining the equity premium puzzle,
the stock premium of the traditional Lucas (1978)-model could very well be doubled
due to approximation errors.
Finally, the risk premium of consumption uncertainty is rather constant across
models, and raises the price of the stock by 0.3%. A price increase is expected, since
consumption uncertainty increases the stock demand for consumption smoothing
purposes.
4.8. Exploiting Excess Return Opportunities
The descriptive success of pT is limited, compared to pE. However, due to
the strong normative foundation of the original theoretical model, observed price
deviations from pT might offer excess return opportunities to the rational investor.
Assume that the theoretical model in (4) and (5.A) is a precise description of the
rational investor’s micro-situation, and assume that the investor uses the model
for expectation formation (theoretical expectations). Consider the utility gained
by giving up consumption worth one unit of utility at time t − 1, investing the
funds in stocks, and consuming the total value of the investment at time t. Let
∂ut denote the overall utility gained by this transaction. According to the Euler
equation, the expected utility gain should be zero in equilibrium. However, the
realized gain might differ, of course.
Table 4 shows a few statistics on the relation between the actual realized utility
gains ∂ut and the one-year-in-advance expected utility gains ∂u
e
t based on the
theoretical rationality model MTA . There is significant linear dependence between
∂ut and ∂u
e
t , and the correlation is almost 0.25. The theoretical model is therefore
capable of predicting utility gain opportunities, but with a regression coefficient at
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Figure 4: Utility gains with theoretical expectations.
Expectations with respect to future return opportunities based at a theoretical model: M TA . The
condence interval is calculated using quasi monte carlo integration, (1000 Niederreider points).
0.1, the model is overestimating the size of utility gain opportunities with a factor
10.
Figure 4 shows ∂ut and ∂u
e
t together with the one-year-in-advance 95% confi-
dence interval based on MTA . Obviously, the confidence with which the theoretical
model predicts ∂ut is far too optimistic. Only 17% of the realized ∂ut-values fall
inside the 95% confidence interval. Although the investment strategy implied by
the model earns a positive utility gain in the long run, Figure 4 shows that there
are at least 3 periods in the sample that would have ruined the investors who took
the full consequence of the model’s predictions: In the years around 1920, 1950,
and 1980 the model would have suggested to borrow, if possible, at a fixed yearly
interest rate of more than 50%, and investing the funds in the S&P index. All in
all, the investment strategy suggested by theoretical rationality seems to be far too
aggressive.14
Now consider a similar experiment with empirical rationality imposed. Assume
again that the micro-situation of the investors is well described by (4) and (5.A).
14It should be noticed that the general equilibrium model does not allow the investor to deviate
from w = 0. Thus, strictly speaking, only marginal changes can be analyzed.
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Table 4
Excess Return Statistics
∂ut = α ∂u
e
t + t
Model α R2 DW Std(∂ut) Std(∂u
e
t ) Corr
MTA 0.100
(0.033)
0.058 1.842 16.33 42.44 0.2436
MEA 0.914
(0.310)
0.054 1.830 16.33 4.713 0.2426
Notes: α is the least square regression coecient. DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic.
Std(∂ut) and Std(∂u
e
t ) are standard deviations for actual and expected utility return. \Corr" is
the correlation between ∂ut and ∂u
e
t .
However, this time investors realize that at the macro-level the price will be subject
to approximation errors as described by MEA . Therefore, investors form empirical
expectations.
The introduction of empirical expectations improves the normative properties
significantly. The relevant α-estimate in Table 4 is no longer significantly different
from 1. Thus, the size of ∂ut is correctly predicted on average by M
E
A . Figure 5,
which should be compared with Figure 4, shows ∂ut together with ∂u
e
t and the 95%
confidence interval based on the empirical rationality model MEA . With 96.3% of
the predictions inside the 95% significance band, also the uncertainty of investing
is accurately predicted by the empirical model.
Figure 5 might explain why serious mispricing is not eliminated by fundamen-
talists. The expected gain might be positive, but the uncertainty involved in spec-
ulating against the market is considerable. Especially, the uncertainty seems to
increase in the years around 1920, 1950, and 1980, when investments in the S&P
index are predicted to be most profitable. Therefore, investment strategies that
recognize approximation errors are more defensive.
5. Conclusion
This paper has presented an alternative to the traditional working hypothesis
that considers structural economic models to be true. This hypothesis causes prac-
tical problems to the researcher, in the form of statistical degeneracy. Moreover,
rational agents are assumed to ignore empirical information that might be impor-
tant. These problems were dealt with using an approximation error approach to
model uncertainty, combined with a new notion of empirical rationality on the part
of the agent. Both the researcher and the agents recognize that the implications
of the model are subject to approximation errors. Nevertheless, it was possible to
keep the analysis in the normative tradition of Savage (1954).
The importance of the approach was illustrated using a Lucas (1978)-type asset
pricing model, modified to accommodate the empirical rationality principle, and
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Figure 5: Utility gains with empirical expectations
Expectations with respect to future return opportunities based at an empirical model: M EA . The
condence interval is calculated using quasi Monte Carlo integration, (1000 Niederreider points).
applied to U.S. stock prices. The significant difference between the empirical and
equilibrium prices was accounted for by introducing approximation errors and al-
lowing the representative investor to re-optimize the investment decision. The new
equilibrium price showed significant descriptive as well as normative improvements.
From a descriptive perspective, two important stock marked puzzles were ad-
dressed. The stock marked excess volatility documented by Shiller (1981) and
Grossman and Shiller (1981) was significantly reduced. Due to the sensitivity of
the equilibrium price to observed approximation errors, the distance between the
empirical price and the equilibrium price was reduced by 90%.
In addition, the equity premium puzzle documented by Mehra and Prescott (1985)
was addressed. Approximation errors represent uncertainty about the appropriate
asset pricing model, and this uncertainty requires an uncertainty premium. The
equity premium puzzle was not solved, but the analysis showed that the total
premium was easily doubled due to approximation errors.
Also the normative properties of the model were improved. The original theo-
retical model predicts excess return opportunities far greater than those actually
realized. Moreover, the model significantly underestimates the risk involved in ex-
ploiting these opportunities. When approximation errors are taken into account,
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the expected gains as well as the uncertainty involved in exploiting them are pre-
dicted without bias. Thus, the empirical model provides much better advices for
stock market investments.
The normative results suggest that investors should take the empirical short-
comings of asset pricing models into account. The descriptive results suggest that
investors in fact do that. If this is true, the researcher may consider approximation
errors for two reasons. First, the descriptive and normative relevance of the mod-
els improve. Secondly, the symmetry of the researcher’s and the agents’ beliefs are
reestablished.
Appendix A Results for the Multiplicative Specification
This appendix presents a number of closed form results for the asset pricing model in
(4) with the multiplicative specifications in (5.M) and (17).
A.1 Closed Form Solution of the Empirical Model
Consider equation (14) in section 3:
pE(d0, c0, z0) = E0
∞∑
t=1
βt
u′(ct)
u′(c0)
dtzt−1zt−2 . . . z1.(22)
Since
dt = d
δt
0 exp(
d
t +δ
d
t−1+δ
2dt−2 + . . .+δ
t−1d1),
ct = c
θt
0 exp(
c
t +θ
c
t−1+θ
2ct−2 + . . .+θ
t−1c1),
zt = z
ζt
0 exp(
z
t +ζ
z
t−1+ζ
2zt−2 + . . .+ζ
t−1z1),
and
ztzt−1 . . . z1
= zζ
t+ζt−1+...+ζ
0 exp
(
zt + (1 + ζ)
z
t−1 + . . . +
(
1 + ζ + . . . + ζt−1
)
z1
)
= z
ζ−ζt+1
1−ζ
0 exp
(
1−ζ
1−ζ 
z
t +
1−ζ2
1−ζ 
z
t−1 + . . . +
1−ζt
1−ζ 
z
1
)
,
equation (22) can be rewritten as
pE(d0, c0, z0)
=
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 E0
[
exp
(
dt + δ
d
t−1 + · · ·+ δ
t−1d1
−γ(ct + θ
c
t−1 + · · ·+ θ
t−1c1 )
+ 1−ζ
0
1−ζ 
z
t +
1−ζ1
1−ζ 
z
t−1 + · · ·+
1−ζt−1
1−ζ0 
z
1
)]
=
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 E0 exp
(
f>0 t + f
>
1 t−1 + · · ·+ f
>
t−11
)
,
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where
fs =
 δs−γθs
1−ζs
1−ζ
 and s =
dscs
zs
 .
Calculating the expected value of the lognormal distributed variables gives the equilibrium
price,
pE(d0, c0, z0) =
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 × exp
(
µ>f0 +
1
2f
>
0 Ωf0
+µ>f1 +
1
2f
>
1 Ωf1
...
+µ>ft−1 +
1
2f
>
t−1Ωft−1
=
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 Ψt,
where
Ψt = exp
(
t−1∑
s=0
hs
)
and hs = µ
>fs +
1
2f
>
s Ωfs.
A.2 Closed Form Solution of the Theoretical Model
The theoretical model is a special case of the empirical model where zt ≡ 1 for all t:
pE(d0, c0, z0) =
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 Λt,
where Λt, is defined like Ψt except that
fTs =
 δs−γθs
0

replaces fs.
A.3 Determination of µ
Consider first the dividend process. For given δ and σ2d, µd is determined such that the
unconditional expectation of the dividend is one:
E[dt] = 1.
Using the transition equation for dividends and repeated substitution gives
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dt = d
δ
t−1 exp 
d
t
=
(
dδt−2 exp 
d
t−1
)δ
exp dt
= dδ
2
t−2 exp(
d
t + δ
d
t−1)
= dδ
τ
t−τ exp(
d
t + δ
d
t−1 + δ
2dt−2 + · · ·+ δ
τ−1dt−τ+1)
→ exp(dt + δ
d
t−1 + δ
2dt−2 + · · · ) as τ →∞.
Hence,
E[dt] = exp
(
(1 + δ + δ2 + · · · )µd +
1
2 (1 + δ
2 + δ4 + · · · )σ2d
)
= exp
(
1
1−δ µd +
1
2(1−δ2)σ
2
d
)
,
and
µd = −
1−δ
2(1−δ2)σ
2
d ⇒ E[dt] = 1.
Using the same arguments for the consumption process gives
µc = −
1−θ
2(1−θ2)σ
2
c ⇒ E[ct] = 1.
To determine µz it should be noted that f
>
i → [0 0
1
1−ζ ] as i →∞. This causes
hs →
1
1−ζ µz +
1
2(1−ζ)2 σ
2
z for s →∞.
Therefore,
Ψt = exp
(
t−1∑
s=0
hs
)
increases exponentially if the limit value of hs is positive. Hence, the equilibrium price is
infinite. To ensure a finite equilibrium price, µz must be bounded by
µz ≤
−σ2z
2(1−ζ) .
Thus, µz =
−σ2z
2(1−ζ) is imposed in the empirical analysis.
A.4 Definition of Risk Premiums and their Closed Form Expressions
Using the following asset pricing functions,
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pE0 (z) = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
β˜tdtE0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1)
]
,
pE0 (d) = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
β˜tE0(dt)zt−1zt−2 · · · z1
]
,
pE0 (d, z) = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
β˜tE0(dt)E0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1)
]
,
pE0 (d, c, z) = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
βt
u′(E0(ct))
u′(c0)
E0(dt)E0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1)
]
,
(23)
the risk premiums with respect to z, d, and c are defined as
piz0 = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
β˜tE0(dt) (zt−1zt−2 · · · z1 − E0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1))
]
= pE0 (d)− p
E
0 (d, z),
pid0 = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
β˜t(dt − E0(dt))E0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1)
]
= pE0 (z)− p
E
0 (d, z),
pic0 = E0
[
∞∑
t=1
βt
u′(ct)− u
′(E0(ct))
u′(c0)
E0(dt)E0(zt−1zt−2 · · · z1)
]
= pE0 (d, z)− p
E
0 (d, c, z).
Since all the pricing functions in (23) are available in closed form, this is also the case for
the risk premiums. Consider first pE(z):
pE0 (z) =
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0
×E0
[
exp
(
dt + δ
d
t−1 + · · ·+ δ
t−1d1 − γ(
c
t + θ
c
t−1 + · · ·+ θ
t−1c1)
)]
×E0
[
exp
(
1−ζ0
1−ζ 
z
t +
1−ζ1
1−ζ 
z
t−1 + · · ·+
1−ζt−1
1−ζ0 
z
1
)]
=
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0 exp
(
t−1∑
s=0
µ>fs +
1
2f
>
s Ω
zfs
)
which is equal to the closed form solution to pE0 except that
Ωz =
 σ2d σd,c 0σd,c σ2c 0
0 0 σ2z

replaces Ω. Likewise, the closed form solutions for pE0 (d) and p
E
0 (d, z) equal the solution
to pE0 , except that Ω is replaced by
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Ωd =
σ2d 0 00 σ2c σd,c
0 σd,c σ
2
z
 and Ωd,z =
σ2d 0 00 σ2c 0
0 0 σ2z
 .
The case of pE0 (d, c, z) is strictly more complicated due to the non-linearity of the utility
function:
pE0 (z, c, d)=
∞∑
t=1
βtc
−γ(θt−1)
0 d
δt
0 z
ζ−ζt
1−ζ
0
×E0 exp(
d
t + δ
d
t−1 + · · ·+ δ
t−1d1)
×E0 exp
(
1−ζ0
1−ζ 
z
t +
1−ζ1
1−ζ 
z
t−1 + · · ·+
1−ζt−1
1−ζ0 
z
1
)
×
(
E0 exp(
c
t + θ
c
t−1 + · · ·+ θ
t−1c1)
)−γ
.
Since (
E0 exp
(
ct + θ
c
t−1 + · · ·+ θ
t−1c1)
))−γ
= exp
(
−γµc − γ
1
2σ
2
c − γθµc − γ
1
2θ
2σ2c − . . .− γθ
t−1µc − γ
1
2θ
2(t−1)σ2c
)
the closed form solution for pE0 (d, c, z) equals the solution for p
E
0 , except that
Ωd,z,c =
σ
2
d 0 0
0 −
σ2c
γ
0
0 0 σ2z

replaces Ω.
Appendix B Numerical Solution Method
The numerical solutions of the models with additive specifications are projection method
solutions to the Euler-equations, see Judd (1992).
The approximation basis consists of tensor cubic b-splines, see de Boor (1978). For
the theoretical and the empirical model, 5× 5 and 5× 5× 5 b-spline elements were used.
Integration with respect to expectations were calculated using 4× 4 and 2× 2× 2 Hermite
points. The size of the state space was chosen such that all integration points were interior.
The b-spline coefficients were chosen to minimize the squared numerical approximation
errors at 13 × 13 and 13 × 13 × 13 approximation points equally spaced over the state
space.
With respect to precision, the numerical solution seemed to violate the Euler equation
with a maximum of 1E-4% over the chosen state space. This precision is, of course,
conditioned on the precision of the integration. However, the quasi Monte Carlo methods
used for calculating the confidence intervals in figures 4 and 5 also showed that the Hermite
integration was quite accurate despite the small number of points.
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